The Role of Inflation Targeting in Debt Denomination in Developing Countries by Ogrokhina, Olena & Rodriguez, Cesar M.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations Economics
9-10-2016
The Role of Inflation Targeting in Debt Denomination in
Developing Countries
Olena Ogrokhina
Lafayette College
Cesar M. Rodriguez
Portland State University, cesar.rodriguez@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac
Part of the International Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Ogrokhina, Olena and Rodriguez, Cesar M., "The Role of Inflation Targeting in Debt Denomination in Developing Countries" (2016).
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations. 76.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac/76
The Role of Inflation Targeting in Debt Denomination in
Developing Countries∗
Olena Ogrokhina†
Lafayette College
Cesar M. Rodriguez‡
Portland State University
September 10, 2016
Abstract
This paper analyzes the inflation targeting experience of developing countries as an effective
monetary policy framework to promote changes in the currency composition of their interna-
tional debt. Using matching with difference-in-differences to address the self-selection bias, we
find that inflation targeting has led to a 3-6 percentage point reduction in the foreign currency
share of international debt in targeting countries when compared to non-targeting countries.
Furthermore, from the analysis of the individual currency shares, we find that inflation tar-
geting has contributed to a 10 percentage points lower US dollar share in international debt
in targeting countries compared to non-targeting countries; while the effects on the euro and
other foreign currencies shares are negligible. This not only provides evidence that the struc-
tural features of international financial markets matter, but also that monetary policy can help
developing countries reduce their reliance on foreign currency debt.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, the world witnessed an unprecedented pace of global integration in financial
markets, with improved access to capital markets providing considerable investment opportunities.
At the same time, this integration has exposed developing countries to external shocks – such as sud-
den cessations of capital flows – that lead to more volatile exchange rates. In particular, balance
sheet effects associated with liabilities denominated in foreign currency and assets denominated
in local currency leave countries prone to financial crises.1 The resulting economic and financial
instability makes it harder for countries to issue debt denominated in local currency, further exacer-
bating currency mismatches which can magnify the effects of adverse shocks, reducing the capacity
of agents to borrow from abroad.2 This vicious cycle was first introduced by Eichengreen et al.
(2002) and Hausmann & Panizza (2003) as the “original sin” hypothesis.
Although the original sin phenomenon has been viewed as universal among developing
countries, a new trend emerged in the mid-2000s when countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and South
Africa successfully issued local currency bonds in international markets.3 This new trend raises
questions regarding the original sin hypothesis. Can developing countries continue to denominate
international debt in local currency, or is this a temporary development with the reliance on foreign
currency impossible to overcome?
Until recently, most scholars agreed that the original sin phenomenon was due to the struc-
tural features of international financial markets, rather than the result of poor domestic policies.
However, Burger et al. (2012) argue that enacting policies to improve macroeconomic stability
and creditor rights supports the development of local currency bond markets, ultimately helping
countries overcome the original sin. Therefore, stable inflation – due to a monetary policy frame-
work such as inflation targeting – coupled with continuing economic growth can increase foreign
investors’ confidence and encourage lending in local currency.
Adopting inflation targeting typically implies that a central bank has an announced nu-
1See for instance, Schneider & Tornell (2004), Frankel (2005), or Aguiar (2005).
2Chang & Velasco (2016) discuss this in the context of conventional and unconventional monetary policy in
emerging economies with financial frictions.
3 Gruić & Wooldridge (2013) describe this emerging behavior.
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merical target for inflation and a commitment to transparency and accountability in conducting
monetary policy. Numerous studies have analyzed the effects of inflation targeting on macroeco-
nomic performance. Most of the studies focusing on developing countries suggest that inflation
targeting reduces inflation and its volatility, output volatility, interest and exchange rate volatility,
and improves fiscal discipline.4 As a result, central banks enjoy an improved credibility that helps
mitigate the dynamic inconsistency problem often faced by developing countries.
Several theoretical papers have associated the lack of credible monetary policy with the
original sin hypothesis. From a lender’s perspective, countries will be charged a risk-premium
if they are unwilling to commit to a credible monetary policy and choose to inflate away the real
value of local currency debt. As Du et al. (2015) argue, countries with credible monetary policy can
lower their local currency return premium, enabling them to issue the most local currency debt.
Similarly, Engel & Park (2016) conclude that countries with less credible monetary policy tend
to issue debt in foreign currency rather local currency since foreign currency offers them a higher
borrowing limit. From a borrower’s perspective, lack of commitment regarding monetary policy will
discourage borrowers to issue debt in local currency. For example, Jeanne (2003) argues that in the
case of uncertain monetary policy, borrowers may choose to dollarize their liabilities to minimize the
probability of default, while Perez & Ottonello (2016) argue that governments will choose to issue
debt in foreign currency as high levels of local currency debt may tempt them to engage in costly
inflation. Consequently, in this article, we analyze the relationship between a disciplined monetary
policy and the currency composition of international debt by demonstrating how inflation targeting
developing countries have reduced their foreign currency shares in international debt compared to
non-targeting developing countries.
Based on data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), in 1994 most developing
countries issued nearly all of their international debt in foreign currency. Although foreign currency
shares have declined since the early 2000s, the rate of decline has not been universal across coun-
tries. Separating developing countries into inflation targeters and non-targeters, we observe that
by 2013 inflation targeting countries reduced their foreign currency share of international debt by
7 percentage points, compared to 4 percentage points in the non-targeting countries. Building on
4See for instance, Mishkin (2004), Rose (2007), Lin & Ye (2009), Lin (2010), and Minea & Tapsoba (2014).
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these simple descriptive statistics, we argue that there is an unexplored relationship between the
adoption of inflation targeting and the denomination of international debt. After all, once inflation
is under control, denominating international debt in local currency should be a viable option for
countries to diversify and reduce their exposure to exchange rate fluctuations.
Since inflation targeting is often introduced following a crisis, or after the failure of other
monetary strategies to stabilize prices, the adoption of inflation targeting is not fully exogenous. To
address this problem, recent studies have employed a variety of empirical strategies. For instance,
Batini et al. (2007), Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), and Gonçalves & Salles (2008) employ
a difference-in-differences strategy to analyze the impact of inflation targeting on the inflation
rate. However, the decision of a country to implement an inflation targeting policy is not random,
and these studies are unable to control for all unobservable characteristics (such as the strategic
behavior of central banks) leading to an endogeneity problem. To overcome this issue of self-
selection, other studies have employed matching strategies to carefully construct appropriate control
groups. Vega & Winkelried (2005), Lin & Ye (2007), Lin & Ye (2009), Lin (2010), Flood & Rose
(2010), Frappa & Mésonnier (2010), and Minea & Tapsoba (2014) use propensity score matching
to analyze the average treatment effect of inflation targeting on macroeconomic variables such as
the level and volatility of inflation, exchange rate regime, international reserves, fiscal performance,
output volatility, and business cycle synchronization. Nonetheless, these matching estimators can
be deemed weak due to their heavy reliance on a strict “selection on observables” assumption.
Therefore, in our empirical analysis of 75 developing countries from 1994-2013, we address the
self-selection bias associated with the adoption of inflation targeting by combining a difference-in-
differences strategy with a variety of propensity score matching methods; this allows us to control
both observable and unobservable characteristics.
In this article we provide the following contributions to the literature. First, we empirically
analyze the effect of inflation targeting on the foreign currency share of international debt. We find
supporting evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting has led to a reduction in the foreign
currency share of international debt by an average of 3 percentage points compared to non-targeting
countries. Given that the implementation of inflation targeting in developing countries is relatively
new, we expect to see an even bigger impact going forward as existing long-term debt matures.
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Furthermore, as Mishkin (2004) discusses, the benefits of adopting inflation targeting might not
materialize immediately, because monetary authorities need time to establish credibility in order
to fully achieve their long-term targets. Thus, when we restrict our sample of inflation targeting
countries to those with an unchanged target or target range, the effect of adopting inflation targeting
increases to an average of 6 percentage points compared to non-targeting countries. Second, we
extend the discussion on the original sin hypothesis by incorporating the effect of monetary policy.
In particular, we provide evidence that not only do the structural features of global financial markets
matter, but a monetary policy framework such as inflation targeting can have a significant effect
on the alleviation of original sin.
Third, we analyze the reliance on foreign currency not only at the aggregate level, but at
the individual level as well. This allows us to distinguish between changes attributable to specific
currencies in international debt markets. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to
analyze the effect of inflation targeting on the currency composition of international debt. Looking
at individual currencies, we find that inflation targeting developing countries had a US dollar share
of international debt 10 percentage points lower than non-targeting countries, while the effects on
the euro and other foreign currencies shares appear negligible. This finding has significant policy
implications. Specifically, the expansion of dollar denominated international debt following the
Federal Reserve’s large-scale bond purchasing program has transmitted US monetary easing to
developing countries. Additionally, the increase in the dollar share of international debt in non-
targeting countries can have potential consequences for these countries’ financial stability in the
future, emphasizing the importance of policy-oriented solutions in reducing developing countries’
reliance on foreign currency debt.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset and methodology; Section
3 presents the main findings and robustness analyses; and Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
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2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data Description
Our dataset consists of 75 developing countries examined from 1994 through 2013. By 2013, fifteen
developing countries had formally adopted inflation targeting. This implies that the central banks
of these countries have made an explicit announcement to pursue price stability as the primary
objective of their monetary policy by adopting a quantitative target for inflation. The commitment
to these policies assumes a high degree of transparency and central bank accountability for their
performance in achieving the inflation objective. Table A1 provides a list of these countries and the
years when inflation targeting was introduced. The dates used in our analysis come from Hammond
(2012) and Roger (2010).
The adoption of inflation targeting could have a delayed effect since the potential benefits do
not materialize immediately. To address the differential effect associated with this delay, we follow
Ball & Sheridan (2004), Mishkin (2004), and Lin & Ye (2007) and define the start of constant
or stationary inflation targeting as the first year in which a country had an unchanging target or
target range for an indefinite period of time (until 2013). For example, while the inflation target
has been constant since its inception in some countries – e.g., in Chile the inflation target has
remained at 3% since 2001 – in other countries the initial inflation target was set at a higher level
and meant to eventually converge to a lower level – e.g. in Brazil the inflation target was set at 8%
in 1999 and lowered to 4.5% by 2005. As a result, Chile has had a constant inflation target since
2001, while Brazil has had a constant target since 2005. This more restrictive definition of inflation
targeting enables us to deal with the potential differences between having a publicly announced
specific target or target range and a situation in which a country is able to maintain a constant
inflation target. According to this definition, twelve countries had a constant inflation target by
2013. Table A1 column (2) lists the years when inflation targeting countries began to maintain
their constant inflation targets. Table A2 lists the remaining developing countries used for this
analysis that did not adopt inflation targeting.
The data on international debt come from the BIS’ Debt Securities Statistics. We focus
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solely on total international debt, defined as debt issued outside the market of the issuing country
by the general government, banks, other financial corporations, and non-financial corporations.5
While debt can be issued domestically, as well as internationally, domestic debt can be subject to
government interventions to influence pricing and the market formation of debt securities through
regulatory controls or other arbitrary measures.6 Using an individual country’s reports of debt
securities issued and amounts outstanding by residence and nationality of issuer, we construct the
measure of foreign currency share = 1 − local currency debttotal international debt . The BIS reports data on debt
securities distinguishing between securities issued in dollars, euros, other foreign currencies, and
local currency.7
The majority of the other variables are drawn from the World Bank (WB) and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) databases. Gross domestic product (GDP), private credit, and trade open-
ness are taken from the WB’s World Development Indicators. We use GDP rather than GDP per
capita to capture the size effect of the country. As a measure of financial development we use total
private credit over GDP. The sum of exports plus imports as a share of GDP is our measure for
trade openness. Inflation and fiscal balance are taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and
are measured as the average 12 month rate, and the difference between revenues and expenditures
as a share of GDP, respectively. The world exports share measures the relative importance of a
country in world trade, and is defined as the ratio of a country’s exports to total world exports.
This data come from the IMF’s Direction of Trade.
The measure of financial openness is from Chinn & Ito (2006). It is based on information
regarding regulatory restrictions on cross-border capital transactions reported in the IMF’s An-
nual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically, it is
the first standardized principal component of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple
exchange rates, restrictions on current account and capital account transactions, and the require-
ment for the surrender of export proceeds. The measure of exchange rate flexibility is the de facto
exchange rate regime classification by Reinhart & Rogoff (2004) extended by Reinhart & Rogoff
5In most developing countries issuance by banks and other financial corportations has traditionally been limited.
6Moreover, the BIS does not currently have publicly available data on the currency composition of domestic debt.
7The BIS provides data on only two major currencies: dollars and euros (including legacy currencies). All other
currencies are aggregated into the “other foreign currencies” group. Therefore, we report the results separately for
dollars, euros, and other foreign currencies shares.
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(2009).
Finally, to capture the level of institutional quality, we include a set of variables that measure
different aspects of institutional development. These variables include: democratic accountability,
ethnic tensions, religious tensions, law and order, military in politics, corruption, external conflict,
internal conflict, government stability, and socioeconomic conditions. These all are taken from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled by the Political Risk Services Group. Table A3
details the definitions and sources of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
To observe the evolution of the foreign currency share in international debt over time, Figure 1
plots the foreign currency shares for three groups of countries: all inflation targeting countries, con-
stant inflation targeting countries, and non-targeting countries. Up until the early 2000s, inflation
targeting and non-targeting countries had their foreign currency shares around 99%. Although all
three foreign currency shares have experienced a decline since then, the gap between targeters and
non-targeters has widened. As is evident from Figure 1, countries that adopted inflation targeting
show systematically lower shares of foreign currency in their international debt, with the constant
inflation targeting countries exhibiting the largest decrease, reaching 89% by 2012. Thailand, for
example, which introduced inflation targeting in 2000 and reached their constant inflation target
in 2009, reduced their foreign currency share in international debt to 73%. On the other hand,
non-targeting countries show the smallest decrease, with their foreign currency share falling to
95% by 2010, only to rise to 96% by 2013. All in all, between 1994 and 2013 the declines in the
foreign currency shares for inflation targeting countries, constant inflation targeting countries, and
non-targeting countries constitute 5.2, 8.2, and 3.1 percentage points, respectively.
The data from the BIS allow us to compute the foreign currency shares in international
debt by distinguishing between what was issued in local currency from the total international debt.
However, this number can potentially obscure important features, as it aggregates all the debts
issued in foreign currencies. To further analyze the decline of the total foreign currency share in
inflation targeting countries observed in Figure 1, we decompose the total international debt into
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dollars, euros, other foreign currencies, and local currency.
Figure 2 presents the composition of international debt for inflation targeting countries
(Panel A) and for non-inflation targeting countries (Panel B) in 1994 and 2013. It is evident that
the largest share of debt issued by developing countries is denominated in dollars which accounts
for around 80% of total international debt for both inflation targeting and non-targeting countries.
However, in comparison to other currency shares the dollar share exhibited the largest change from
1994 to 2013. While inflation targeting countries decreased their dollar share by almost 2 percentage
points, non-targeting countries increased their dollar share by 10 percentage points. This increase
in the dollar share is not surprising. The European Central Bank (ECB (2014)) presents evidence
of the continuous growth of dollar denominated international debt in emerging markets. Therefore,
the dollar credit expansion observed after the financial crisis can explain the increased dollar share
in the composition of international debt in non-targeting countries.
Regarding the other currency shares, both targeting and non-targeting countries decreased
their other foreign currencies shares, keeping the euro shares stable. In conclusion, the shares
of debt across all currencies are more volatile in countries that do not target inflation; i.e., non-
targeting countries experienced a greater change in their currency composition of international debt
compared to inflation targeting countries.
2.3 Estimation Strategy
As presented in Figure 1, both inflation targeting and non-targeting countries exhibit a downward
trend in their foreign currency shares in international debt. Consequently, it would be misleading
to estimate the effect of inflation targeting on the foreign currency shares by simply comparing
the shares of foreign currency before and after the adoption of the inflation targeting. To avoid
overestimating the effect of the policy, we use the non-inflation targeting countries as a control group
to estimate the counterfactual outcome in order to account for secular trends, and to separate the
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effect of the policy (treatment). We estimate the following baseline specification:
yi,t = αi + γt + β · treatementi · afteri,t + δ ·Xi,t + εi,t
= αi + γt + β · ITi,t + δ ·Xi,t + εi,t
(1)
(2)
where yi,t is a measure of foreign currency share in international debt, αi is a country fixed effect
to capture all time-invariant country-specific factors that affect the outcome, and γt is the time
dummy to account for shocks that similarly affect both inflation targeting and non-targeting coun-
tries. treatmenti is a binary variable indicating whether country i adopted inflation targeting,
and afteri,t is a dummy indicating the time of the inflation targeting adoption for each inflation
targeting country i. The product of these two variables, ITi,t, equals to 1 if country i in year t
was targeting inflation and zero otherwise. Xi,t is a vector of time-varying control variables, such
as GDP, inflation, trade openness, share of world exports, international debt to GDP ratio, finan-
cial development, exchange rate regime, capital account openness, fiscal balance, and the quality
of institutions. εi,t is the usual error term assumed to be uncorrelated with ITi,t. The choice
of control variables relies mainly on the determinants of the original sin from Eichengreen et al.
(2002) and Hausmann & Panizza (2003). We add capital account openness to capture the effect
of international investor demand access. Finally, following Burger & Warnock (2006) and Burger
et al. (2012), we include a variety of measures for institutional quality to capture the effect of laws
and regulations on the share of foreign currency in international debt.
If the adoption of inflation targeting was determined by observable factors, then these
control variables should be enough to identify the effect of inflation targeting on the foreign currency
share in international debt. However, some of the relevant factors are unobservable (for instance,
the strategic behavior of central banks, political decisions, etc.), and thus cannot be accounted
for. Given the non-random selection of the policy adoption and our inability to control for all
unobservable characteristics, Equation 1 can be affected by an endogeneity problem.
As a result, we could be facing a self-selection problem, since the decision of a country to
implement inflation targeting could be correlated with a set of observable variables which also affect
the outcome variable. This issue emphasizes the need for careful construction of a control group.
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To achieve this objective we use the matching method developed by Heckman & Robb (1985)
and Heckman et al. (1998) that pairs each treated observation with the most similar member of
the control group on the basis of their observable characteristics. To determine the conditional
probability (propensity score) of the adoption of inflation targeting, we use a probit model that
includes the following variables: the lagged inflation rate, broad money growth, trade openness,
fiscal balance, real GDP per capita growth, exchange rate regime, and a lagged measure of the
outcome variable. As discussed in Svensson (2002) and Mishkin (2004), these variables define
whether a country meets the necessary pre-conditions to begin an inflation targeting policy.
Using matching to estimate the treatment effect relies on the assumption that the selec-
tion into the inflation targeting framework depends only on the variables specified above; i.e.,
the “selection on observables” assumption. However, it is clear that there are many unobserved
or unaccounted factors that can create systematic differences between the treatment and control
groups, affecting the outcome variable. To address this issue, Blundell & Dias (2002), Arnold &
Javorcik (2009), and Grg et al. (2008) suggest combining matching with difference-in-differences.
This method estimates the conditional probability of treatment by using propensity score matching
and incorporates it into a fixed-effects specification to control for both observable and unobservable
characteristics.
Therefore, in our empirical analysis we employ two approaches that rely on matching
with difference-in-differences. The first approach follows Blundell & Dias (2002) and restricts the
difference-in-differences regression to observations with the common support – where the propen-
sity scores of treated and control groups overlap. The second approach follows Rotnitzky & Robins
(1995), Hirano & Imbens (2001), and Hirano et al. (2003) and consists of performing a fixed effects
regression weighted by the inverse of the estimate of the propensity score. The main idea behind
this methodology is to use the estimated propensity scores as weights in a regression of the outcome
variable on the treatment indicator as specified in Equation 1. As Hirano & Imbens (2001) argue,
it is preferable to combine matching procedures and weighting, rather than to rely solely on one of
these methods to remove bias. In fact, given that weights are a function of the estimated propen-
sity scores, they create a balance in the covariates across treated and control units in the probit
regression, reducing the bias in the estimator of the effect of inflation targeting on our outcome
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variable. Specifically, let p̂(x) be the estimated propensity score of adopting inflation targeting.
Then, Hirano & Imbens (2001) propose using 1/p̂(x) and 1/(1− p̂(x)) as the weights for the treated
and control units respectively.
Consequently, we estimate three sets of regressions. The first regression is a simple difference-
in-differences (fixed-effects) specification presented in Equation 1. We use this as our baseline case
for the effect of inflation targeting on the foreign currency share of international debt. Second, we
use the propensity scores generated by the probit regression and re-estimate Equation 1 under the
common support, restricting observations to those where the propensity scores of the treatment
and control groups overlap. Third, we use the propensity scores as the predicted probability of the
adoption of inflation targeting to weight the treated and control units in the fixed-effects regression.
3 Estimation Results
3.1 Total Foreign Currency Share
Our main results are presented in Table 1, where the dependent variable is the foreign currency
share of international debt. Column (1) presents the results from estimating Equation 1 using the
baseline difference-in-differences specification. We find that the introduction of inflation targeting
reduces the foreign currency share in international debt in developing countries by 3.2 percentage
points compared to other developing countries that did not introduce inflation targeting. This
result is statistically and economically significant.
Regarding other determinants of the foreign currency share of international debt, we find
that country size, inflation rate, and capital account openness all play significant roles. As argued
by Hausmann & Panizza (2003), small countries with less economies of scale will tend to rely more
on foreign currency to denominate their international debt. We measure the size of the economy
by its GDP and its share in world exports. While the point estimate for GDP is insignificant,
the share in world exports is negative and strongly significant. This result suggests that the size
effect in developing countries relies heavily on the trade channel. We also find a significant negative
effect of inflation on the share of foreign currency. This is consistent with Claessens et al. (2007)
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who argue that countries with high inflation do not need to issue large amounts of foreign debt, as
the inflation tax is usually a major source of revenue. Finally, we find that higher capital account
openness results in a significantly lower foreign currency share of international debt. This is to be
expected since international investors can use the currency from a country with more open financial
markets as an investment opportunity. Thus, the higher the degree of capital account openness,
the more likely a country will issue debt in its local currency.
Columns (2) - (4) present the results of the estimation of Equation 1 using difference-in-
differences over the common support defined by the matching procedure described in Section 2.3.
Columns (5) - (7) present the results of using the inverse of the propensity scores as weights in
the difference-in-differences estimation. In particular, columns (2) - (3) and (5) - (6) report the
effect of inflation targeting using two nearest-neighbor matching estimators with n = 1 and n = 3,
respectively, while columns (4) and (7) use a kernel matching estimator.8 The results for the
common support sample and the weighted regression are very similar to those from column (1).
Specifically, we find that relative to the control group of non-inflation targeting developing countries,
the implementation of inflation targeting reduces the foreign currency share of international debt
between 2.5 to 3.4 percentage points.
In conclusion, our results confirm the previous findings that emphasize the importance of
exogenous factors (such as size or trade) as determinants of the currency composition of interna-
tional debt. However, we also find that endogenous policies, specifically inflation targeting, can
help developing countries reduce their reliance on foreign currency in international debt.
3.2 Alternative Specifications
In this subsection we check the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. Table 2
reports the results using the same methodologies as in Table 1: column (1) is our baseline spec-
ification, columns (2) - (4) are the difference-in-differences over the common support determined
by the matching procedures, and columns (5) - (7) use the inverse propensity scores as weights in
the difference-in-differences estimation. Although Table 2 reports only the coefficients associated
8We also tried various radius matching estimators and obtained very similar results that we do not report but
which are available upon request.
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with the inflation targeting variable (coefficient β from Equation 1), all specifications include the
covariates previously defined in Equation 1 and presented in Table 1. Table 2 is organized in the
following manner: Panel A presents the results using the constant inflation targeting dates, Panels
B and C present the results using additional variables in the probit specification while keeping
the difference-in-differences specification unchanged, and Panels D and E present the results with
additional controls in our difference-in-differences regression.
Ball & Sheridan (2004) and Mishkin (2004) argue that the effects of inflation targeting might
be observed only some years after its implementation. If so, our results could be underestimating
the effect of inflation targeting due to the timing of the policy. To address this potential concern,
in Panel A we re-estimate the regressions from Table 1 using the constant inflation targeting
dates. Results show that the effect of inflation targeting becomes stronger. In particular, the
effect of an inflation targeting policy in developing countries that have achieved a constant or
stationary inflation target reduces the foreign currency share of international debt between 5.7 to
6.7 percentage points compared to developing countries that did not implement the policy.
Svensson (2002) and Mishkin (2004), among others, discuss the prerequisites for the adop-
tion of inflation targeting. Building on these prerequisites, Samarina & De Haan (2014) examine
a list of variables that may influence countries’ choice to target inflation. They group these de-
terminants into five categories: macroeconomic, fiscal, external, financial, and institutional. Our
main probit specification already controls for most of these pre-conditions. However, to account for
financial and institutional factors, we expand the probit regressions by adding the government debt
to GDP ratio and the five-year central bank governor turnover rate as an inverse proxy of central
bank independence. Once these factors are accounted for, the results remain qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to those from Table 1. In Panel B, where we include the government debt to
GDP ratio in the probit specification, the effect of adopting inflation targeting in developing coun-
tries is negative and statistically significant, with an effect between 2.8 and 3.4 percentage points
relative to non-targeting countries. Similarly, in Panel C, where we add the central bank governor’s
turnover rate, we find that the adoption of inflation targeting decreases the foreign currency share
of international debt between 2.4 and 3.5 percentage points relative to non-targeting countries.
Finally, we check if our results are sensitive to the inclusion of additional covariates in
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the difference-in-differences specification. First, from a balance sheet perspective, if a country has
foreign currency denominated international debt, exchange rate movements will have aggregate
wealth effects. Thus, a low exchange rate volatility can create the necessary incentives to increase
foreign currency exposure, limiting the development of the local currency market. To capture this
effect, we include the exchange rate volatility as an additional regressor in Equation 1. Panel D
reports the results. After controlling for the exchange rate volatility, the adoption of inflation
targeting reduces the foreign currency share of international debt between 2.8 and 3.4 percentage
points compared to non-targeting countries. Second, international capital flows can also provide
a direct source of influence on the currency composition of international debt. This effect can
be captured by FDI flows, potentially determining the currency denomination of investment and
playing a key role in the choice of the denomination of liabilities and international debt. Panel
E from Table 2 reports the inflation targeting coefficient estimates. The results remain strongly
significant and robust. After controlling for the level of FDI, the adoption of inflation targeting
reduces the foreign currency share of international debt between 2.5 and 3.4 percentage points
compared to non-inflation targeting developing countries.
3.3 Individual Currencies
The empirical literature on the currency composition of international debt mostly concentrates on
the analysis of foreign currency aggregates.9 However, over the years, many scholars have shown
that the dynamics of aggregate variables can be different from the dynamics of micro variables.10
Therefore, understanding the behavior of individual foreign currencies in the denomination of inter-
national debt – rather than the aggregate share of foreign currency – can provide additional insights
into our study. This is particularly relevant given that the two main currencies in international
debt denomination – the dollar and euro – have followed opposite trends almost since the euro’s
inception.11 Furthermore, as far as we are aware, our study is one of the first to look into individual
currencies in international debt. Using a different dataset from the BIS, Cohen (2005) might be
one of the first scholars to discuss international debt at the individual currency level, and more
9See Hausmann & Panizza (2003), Eichengreen et al. (2002), and Claessens et al. (2007) among others.
10For example, Abadir & Talmain (2002), Pesaran (2003), and Hsiao et al. (2005)
11See for instance Chinn & Frankel (2008) where they analyze the rise of the euro as a new currency and its
potential to rival the dollar.
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recently, Ito & Rodriguez (2015) use the newly available BIS data to analyze the determinants of
the use of individual currencies for debt denomination.
Using the same methodology as in Section 3.1, we revisit our analysis of the individual cur-
rency shares in total international debt. Thus, we redefine Equation 1 substituting the (aggregate)
foreign currency share with (i) the dollar share, (ii) the euro share, and (iii) the remaining other
foreign currencies share in international debt. Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the results for the dollar,
the euro, and the other foreign currencies shares, respectively. All three tables have a similar lay-
out. They all report only inflation targeting coefficient (β) associated with the effect of adopting
the policy. In each table, Panel A provides the results of the baseline specification of Equation 1
for their respective individual currency shares. Panels B and C add the government debt to GDP
ratio and five-year central bank governor turnover rate to the probit estimates of the propensity
scores. Panels D and E check the sensitivity of the results by including the exchange rate volatility
and the level of FDI as additional controls in the difference-in-differences specification.
Panel A from Table 3 shows that for the baseline specification, the implementation of
inflation targeting results in a significantly lower dollar share of international debt, an average of 9.0
percentage points lower in targeting countries, relative to non-inflation targeting countries. When
we incorporate the government debt to GDP ratio (Panel B) or the five-year central bank governor
turnover rate (Panel C) as additional regressors in the probit model the results remain similar,
confirming a lower dollar share of international debt (7.6 to 10.3 percentage points) compared to
non-targeting countries. Finally, when we check the sensitivity of our specification by including
exchange rate volatility and FDI in Equation 1 – Panels D and E – the results hold and are
quantitatively similar to those of our baseline regression.
Our interpretation of the results for the dollar share is as follows. Since 2008, the Fed-
eral Reserve – via large-scale asset purchase policies – has injected more than $4 trillion to aid
the financial markets after the recession. These unconventional monetary policies, also known as
quantitative easing, increased credit availability in the lending markets and put downward pressure
on interest rates. As a result, by the end of 2013 the vast majority of government bonds traded
at yields below 1% with some even yielding less than 0%. Such low yields were the goal of the
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Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy.12 Consequently, McCauley et al. (2015) relate
the expansion of dollar denominated bonds to the compression of US Treasury bond yields. This
persuaded investors to purchase the bonds of borrowers outside the US (many rated BBB) which
offered a better spread relative to the low-yielding US treasury bonds.
At the same time, Du et al. (2015) argue that countries with a credible commitment device
can reduce their local currency return premium.13 This reduction can be achieved by committing to
an inflation path – by adopting inflation targeting, for instance – that will keep local currency debt
payouts relatively stable. Thus, while borrowing in dollars became cheaper due to the combination
of low interest rates and increased liquidity, inflation targeting countries, benefiting from a low local
currency return premium, managed to maintain their dollar share of international debt compared
to non-inflation targeting countries which expanded their reliance on the dollar.
The analyses for the euro and the other foreign currencies shares in international debt tell
quite a different story. Tables 4 and 5 present the point estimates for the effect of inflation targeting
on the euro share and the other foreign currencies share respectively. We find no significant effect
for any of the specifications and methodologies employed. It is not surprising that we do not
find a significant effect on the euro share. First of all, as evident from Figure 2, both inflation
targeting and non-targeting countries kept the euro shares of their international debt relatively
constant. Second, other factors might be at work with the introduction of the new currency. For
example, developing countries could have initially switched to the euro in order to diversify, but
returned to the dollar following the financial crisis. As reported in ECB (2014), the issuance of
euro denominated debt has declined since 2008.
A note of caution is needed for the interpretation of the other foreign currencies shares
results. In the Descriptive Statistics section (Figure 2) we reported a reduction in the other for-
eign currencies shares for both inflation targeting and non-targeting countries, however, we find no
statistically significant effect of inflation targeting on the reduction of the other foreign currencies
share. We explain the lack of a significant relationship by pointing out that our measure of other
foreign currencies share bundles many currencies, possibly masking the individual effects of cur-
12Gagnon et al. (2011).
13Specifically, their framework emphasizes the importance of borrowing from risk-averse lenders.
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rencies like the Japanese yen, the British pound, and the Swiss franc. Unfortunately, the BIS does
not report individual currency information on the denomination of international securities.
The foreign currency credit expansion observed after the financial crisis can have significant
implications for the future financial stability of developing countries, as over-reliance on foreign cur-
rency credit can lead to crises. Therefore, the stark difference in the composition of international
debt between targeting and non-targeting countries, with the recent expansion of dollar denomi-
nated debt observed among non-targeting countries, further emphasizes the need for policies that
reduce the reliance of developing countries on foreign currency debt.
4 Concluding Remarks
Previous studies concentrate on the effect of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance
without explicitly addressing the potential benefits to investor confidence that would result from
the reduction of uncertainty. As price stability is attained, denominating international debt in local
currency should be a viable option. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the effect of the adoption
of inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework to reduce the reliance on foreign currency
and influence the currency composition of international debt.
Our empirical analysis addresses the self-selection bias associated with the adoption of infla-
tion targeting, controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics by combining a difference-
in-differences strategy with a variety of propensity score matching methods. We find supporting
evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting has led to a reduction in the foreign currency
share of international debt by 3 to 6 percentage points compared to non-targeting countries. For
individual currencies, we find that inflation targeting has contributed to a 10 percentage points
lower dollar share of international debt in targeting countries compared to non-targeting countries;
while the effect on the euro and other foreign currencies shares is negligible. Our results are statis-
tically significant and robust to alternative specifications of the propensity score matching as well
as the inclusion of other control variables in the baseline specification. However, additional data
– probably at the individual security level – might be needed to fully understand the nature and
behavior of the dollar and euro denominated international debt.
17
While not at odds with previous research, our findings extend the discussion on the nature
of the original sin. On the one hand, our results reinforce that the exogenous factors of financial
markets are important determinants of the original sin. On the other hand, we highlight the
importance of monetary policy – inflation targeting – as an effective mechanism for developing
countries to systematically reduce their foreign currency reliance in international debt.
Thus, our findings contribute to the discussion on the benefits of adopting inflation targeting
in developing countries. Since in this paper we highlight the effect of inflation targeting on the
denomination of total international debt, a natural extension would be to study its effects on
the currency choice of the issuers. In fact, future research is still required to fully understand
how adopting inflation targeting can affect the currency composition of the international debt of
individual national issuers such as banks, other financial corporations, non financial corporations,
and the general government.
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Figure 2: Currency Shares in International Debt
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Table 1: The effect of inflation targeting on the foreign currency share in international debt, 1994-
2013
Common Support Weights
FE n=1 n=3 kernel n=1 n=3 kernel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IT -0.032** -0.025* -0.031** -0.034** -0.029** -0.032*** -0.034***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Debt/GDP 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
KA Openn. -0.031** -0.042** -0.038** -0.029* -0.042* -0.040* -0.035*
(0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
Fin. Dev. 0.058 0.094* 0.085* 0.058 0.075 0.069 0.055
(0.042) (0.050) (0.047) (0.042) (0.051) (0.049) (0.045)
Trade -0.012 -0.082* -0.047 -0.014 -0.060 -0.043 -0.016
(0.025) (0.047) (0.038) (0.025) (0.040) (0.034) (0.025)
EX share -5.534*** -4.839*** -4.871*** -5.525*** -4.874*** -4.892*** -5.297***
(0.474) (0.510) (0.487) (0.479) (0.574) (0.551) (0.539)
Infl. -0.063** -0.079** -0.085*** -0.064** -0.092** -0.094*** -0.080**
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032)
GDP -0.020 -0.060** -0.055*** -0.020 -0.067** -0.063** -0.037
(0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028)
Fisc. Bal. 0.106 0.162 0.151 0.111 0.077 0.076 0.082
(0.103) (0.169) (0.154) (0.106) (0.132) (0.126) (0.102)
E-rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Institutions YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE both YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Within-R2 0.472 0.550 0.524 0.475 0.544 0.529 0.499
Observations 705 474 550 684 474 550 684
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2: The effect of inflation targeting on the foreign currency share in international debt,
alternative specifications, 1994-2013
Common Support Weights
FE n=1 n=3 kernel n=1 n=3 kernel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Constant Inflation Target
IT -0.067*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.066***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Within-R2 0.528 0.633 0.578 0.529 0.645 0.605 0.575
Observations 671 396 486 657 396 486 657
Panel B: Government debt
IT -0.032** -0.024 -0.029* -0.034** -0.021 -0.028* -0.033**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Within-R2 0.472 0.583 0.540 0.479 0.595 0.555 0.514
Observations 705 398 503 652 398 503 652
Panel C: Turnover rate
IT -0.032** -0.024* -0.029** -0.033** -0.030** -0.032*** -0.035***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Within-R2 0.472 0.584 0.551 0.495 0.573 0.556 0.519
Observations 705 442 515 629 442 515 629
Panel D: Exchange rate volatility
IT -0.032** -0.024 -0.031** -0.034** -0.028** -0.031*** -0.034***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Within-R2 0.473 0.553 0.527 0.477 0.549 0.534 0.503
Observations 675 467 536 654 467 536 654
Panel E: Foreign direct investment
IT -0.032** -0.025* -0.032** -0.034** -0.029** -0.032*** -0.034***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Within-R2 0.472 0.551 0.524 0.475 0.545 0.530 0.500
Observations 701 472 548 680 472 548 680
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
specifications include the covariates defined in the baseline specification.
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Table 3: The effect of inflation targeting on the dollar share in international debt, 1994-2013
Common Support Weights
FE n=1 n=3 kernel n=1 n=3 kernel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Basic
IT -0.094* -0.100* -0.091* -0.101* -0.079* -0.074* -0.091**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Within-R2 0.166 0.289 0.311 0.174 0.314 0.318 0.216
Observations 716 467 564 695 467 564 695
Panel B: Government debt
IT -0.094* -0.097* -0.085 -0.098* -0.084** -0.076* -0.083**
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.058) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
Within-R2 0.166 0.316 0.351 0.175 0.382 0.390 0.258
Observations 716 419 463 663 419 463 663
Panel C: Turnover rate
IT -0.094* -0.072 -0.088 -0.103* -0.073 -0.080* -0.099**
(0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
Within-R2 0.166 0.285 0.312 0.178 0.364 0.356 0.222
Observations 716 409 477 640 409 477 640
Panel D: Exchange rate volatility
IT -0.084 -0.098* -0.095* -0.093* -0.080* -0.077* -0.087**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Within-R2 0.223 0.316 0.342 0.244 0.340 0.348 0.277
Observations 675 448 538 654 448 538 654
Panel E: Foreign direct investment
IT -0.089* -0.098* -0.095* -0.098* -0.080** -0.077* -0.089**
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Within-R2 0.215 0.310 0.335 0.235 0.335 0.342 0.271
Observations 701 455 552 680 455 552 680
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
specifications include the covariates defined in the baseline specification.
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Table 4: The effect of inflation targeting on the euro share in international debt, 1994-2013
Common Support Weights
FE n=1 n=3 kernel n=1 n=3 kernel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Basic
IT 0.059 0.085 0.059 0.062 0.048 0.029 0.031
(0.055) (0.062) (0.063) (0.057) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039)
Within-R2 0.157 0.198 0.158 0.157 0.216 0.182 0.172
Observations 705 436 517 684 436 517 684
Panel B: Government debt
IT 0.059 0.022 0.017 0.060 0.018 0.007 0.031
(0.055) (0.067) (0.064) (0.061) (0.045) (0.040) (0.038)
Within-R2 0.157 0.234 0.199 0.153 0.346 0.300 0.254
Observations 705 387 448 652 387 448 652
Panel C: Turnover rate
IT 0.059 0.052 0.070 0.064 0.032 0.041 0.034
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Within-R2 0.157 0.156 0.150 0.164 0.122 0.117 0.123
Observations 705 414 473 629 414 473 629
Panel D: Exchange rate volatility
IT 0.052 0.071 0.043 0.055 0.040 0.020 0.025
(0.054) (0.056) (0.060) (0.056) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039)
Within-R2 0.173 0.219 0.191 0.174 0.231 0.204 0.188
Observations 675 406 487 654 406 487 654
Panel E: Foreign direct investment
IT 0.054 0.078 0.051 0.058 0.045 0.025 0.028
(0.054) (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039)
Within-R2 0.163 0.201 0.168 0.164 0.218 0.188 0.178
Observations 701 432 513 680 432 513 680
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
specifications include the covariates defined in the baseline specification.
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Table 5: The effect of inflation targeting on the other foreign currencies share in international debt,
1994-2013
Common Support Weights
FE n=1 n=3 kernel n=1 n=3 kernel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Basic
IT 0.002 0.036 0.034 0.005 0.039 0.037 0.024
(0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Within-R2 0.246 0.462 0.454 0.253 0.439 0.435 0.274
Observations 705 462 525 684 462 525 684
Panel B: Government debt
IT 0.002 0.018 -0.008 0.005 0.021 0.006 0.021
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.028) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022)
Within-R2 0.246 0.448 0.465 0.254 0.565 0.526 0.293
Observations 705 378 462 652 378 462 652
Panel C: Turnover rate
IT 0.002 0.002 0.033 0.009 0.013 0.037 0.027
(0.025) (0.016) (0.036) (0.028) (0.017) (0.029) (0.024)
Within-R2 0.246 0.528 0.354 0.271 0.544 0.357 0.302
Observations 705 411 479 629 411 479 629
Panel D: Exchange rate volatility
IT 0.001 0.037 0.037 0.004 0.041 0.041 0.025
(0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Within-R2 0.251 0.469 0.466 0.258 0.457 0.455 0.279
Observations 675 455 495 654 455 495 654
Panel E: Foreign direct investment
IT 0.003 0.036 0.035 0.006 0.039 0.038 0.025
(0.025) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Within-R2 0.246 0.462 0.456 0.254 0.441 0.436 0.276
Observations 701 460 521 680 460 521 680
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
specifications include the covariates defined in the baseline specification.
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Appendix
Table A1: Inflation targeting countries and starting years
Countries Inflation Targeting Year Constant Inflation Targeting Year
Albania 2009 2009
Armenia 2006 2007
Brazil 1999 2005
Chile 1999 2001
Colombia 1999 2010
Ghana 2007
Guatemala 2005
Indonesia 2005
Mexico 2001 2002
Peru 2002 2007
Philippines 2002 2011
South Africa 2000 2000
Thailand 2000 2009
Turkey 2006 2012
Uruguay 2002 2007
Notes : The starting dates of inflation targeting come from Hammond (2012) and Roger (2010).
The constant inflation targeting starting year is the first year in which a country had an unchanging
target or target range. Our sample of inflation targeting developing countries excludes Israel and
South Korea. Beginning 1997, the World Economic Outlook includes these countries in the list
of the advanced economies. The reclassification is explained by the advanced stage of economic
development in these countries, IMF (1997).
31
Table A2: Non-targeting countries – control group
Countries
Algeria Argentina Azerbaijan Bahamas
Bahrain Barbados Belarus Belize
Bermuda Bolivia China Congo
Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Cuba Dominican Republic
Egypt Fiji Gabon Georgia
Grenada Haiti India Iran
Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan
Kenya Kuwait Lebanon Liberia
Macedonia, FYR Malaysia Marshall Islands Mauritius
Morocco Namibia Nicaragua Nigeria
Oman Pakistan Papua New Guinea Paraguay
Qatar Romania Russia Saudi Arabia
Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sri Lanka
Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Ukraine
United Arab Emirates Venezuela Vietnam Zimbabwe
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Table A3: Data Sources and Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Foreign Currency Share Share of foreign currency in international
debt = 1 - (local currency debt/total in-
ternational debt)
Debt Securities Statis-
tics, Bank of Inter-
national Settlements
(BIS)
Inflation Targeting Binary variable = 1 if in a given year a
country operates under inflation target-
ing, 0 otherwise.
Hammond (2012) and
Roger (2010)
GDP Gross Domestic Product (current US$) World Development In-
dicators (WDI), World
Bank (WB)
Financial Development Domestic credit to private sector (% of
GDP)
WDI, WB
Trade Openness Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP) WDI, WB
Inflation Consumer price index (annual %) World Economic Out-
look (WEO), IMF
Fiscal Balance General government revenues minus ex-
penditures (% of GDP)
WEO, IMF
Share of World Exports Total exports / Total world exports Direction of Trade, IMF
Financial Openness Capital Account Openness index Chinn & Ito (2006)
updated from
http://web.pdx.edu/ ito/
Exchange Rate Regime De facto exchange rate classification that
varies within 15 categories where a low
(high) value indicates a fixed (flexible)
regime.
Reinhart & Ro-
goff (2004) and
Reinhart & Rogoff
(2009). Updated from
www.carmenreinhart.com/data/
Exchange Rate Volatil-
ity
Standard deviation of the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate
WEO, IMF
Foreign Direct Invest-
ment
Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (%
of GDP)
WEO, IMF
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Variable Definition Source
Democratic Account-
ability
Democratic Accountability index, 0-6 International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG),
The Political Risk
Services Group (PRS
Group)
Ethnic Tensions Ethnic Tensions index, 0-6 ICRG, PRS Group
Religion Tensions Religion Tensions index, 0-6 ICRG, PRS Group
Law and Order Law and Order index, 0-6 ICRG, PRS Group
Military in Politics Military in Politics index, 0-6 ICRG, PRS Group
Corruption Corruption index, 0-6 ICRG, PRS Group
External Conflict External Conflict index, 0-12 ICRG, PRS Group
Internal Conflict Internal Conflict index, 0-12 ICRG, PRS Group
Government Stability Government Stability index, 0-12 ICRG, PRS Group
Socieconomic Condi-
tions
Socieconomic Conditions index, 0-12 ICRG, PRS Group
Broad Money Growth Annual growth rate of money and quasi
money
WEO, IMF
Real GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) WDI, WB
Governor’s Turnover
Rate
Central Bank governors turnover rates, re-
verse proxy of central bank independence
Dreher et al. (2010)
Government Gross
Debt
General government gross debt (% of
GDP)
WDI, WB
34
